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REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL AGE




Employment discrimination, in its various forms, was a topic ac-
corded much attention within the political agenda of the administration
of President Johnson. Along with the host of legislation passed to ad-
dress racial, religious and sexual discrimination, Congress in 1967 en-
acted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).I At the heart
of the ADEA are provisions which prohibited age discrimination. 2 In ad-
dition to educational programs designed to reduce barriers to employ-
ment,3 the Act also contained an enforcement mechanism which allowed
suit by the aggrieved employee.
4
The prohibitions against age discrimination found in the ADEA
were patterned after the substantive provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 5 As a result, many issues arising under
the ADEA have been resolved by resort to cases decided under Title
VII. The remedial provisions of the ADEA 6 were patterned, not after
Title VII, but after the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 7 Hence, the
ADEA vests broad discretion in the trial court to fashion whatever legal
* Partner, Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson, Denver, Colorado; J.D., Drake
University (1976); B.A., Colorado State University (1969).
** Associate, Rothgerber, Appel, Powers & Johnson, Denver, Colorado; J.D., Uni-
versity of Michigan (1982); B.A., University of Denver (1978).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982). President Johnson was particularly concerned with
age discrimination. In January of 1967, the president publically endorsed the concept of
remedial legislation in what has become known as the Older Americans Message. Statis-
tics quoted by the president indicated that persons over age 45 comprised 27 percent of
the unemployed and accounted for over three-quarters of a billion dollars in unemploy-
ment compensation annually. See H. REP. No. 90-805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in
1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213, 2214. The ADEA applies to individuals in the
40 to 70 year age range. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982). In pertinent part the legislation states:
(a) it shall be unlawful for an employer-
(i) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age:
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age;
or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this
chapter.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2 0 00e-2000e-17 (1982).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982). See also H. REP. No. 90-805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted
in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2218 and 2222-3.
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
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or equitable relief is deemed appropriate to effectuate the purpose of
the Act.8 This is in sharp contrast to Title VII, which provides only for
equitable relief.9
The ADEA has become a fertile source of litigation,' 0 but very few
of the remedial issues raised by the ADEA have been addressed by the
Supreme Court. Unfortunately the Circuit Courts of Appeals have
reached varying solutions to many of the central issues. The ADEA
practitioner is faced with a morass of cases suggesting various ap-
proaches to the determination of appropriate relief under the ADEA.
The confusion in this area is compounded by the fact that some courts
rather blindly adhere to Title VII principles, while others attempt to
draw from FLSA precedent in determining remedial issues under the
ADEA. As stated, the remedial provisions of Title VII vary substantially
from those of the ADEA. The FLSA, on the other hand, was not drafted
to deal with the problem of the employee who is discharged for discrimi-
natory reasons. Therefore, neither statute provides a perfect model for
resolution of ADEA remedial problems.'
Due to the divergence of judicial approaches to ADEA remedial is-
sues, evaluation of the potential recovery by a plaintiff-employee and of
the corresponding potential exposure of a defendant-employer is prob-
lematical. In an effort to provide some guidance to the practitioner in
this area, this article will survey the judicial resolution of various remedy
issues arising under the ADEA. The focus of the article will be on the
remedies available to an individual employee who is discharged in viola-
tion of the ADEA. Discussion will be limited, for the most part, to issues
of monetary relief. 12
8. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and (c) (1982).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). The equitable nature of back pay awards under
the Civil Rights Act is discussed in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-25
(1975).
10. Statistics released by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
show that the Commission filed 89 lawsuits under the ADEA during fiscal year 1981. This
is the largest number of ADEA suits filed by the government in one year. EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT OPPORTUNITY NEWS, 10/6/81. An informal survey of cases filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado from January 1982 through October 1984 also
reveals a continuing substantial increase in the number of age discrimination cases. The
survey consisted of a review of the civil cover sheets filed in that court. In 1982, 20 law-
suits which included a claim of violation of ADEA were filed. In 1984, as of October 15th,
39 such lawsuits had been filed. This represents an increase of approximately fifty percent
in the number of age discrimination cases filed in the District of Colorado during that
period.
11. For general discussions of ADEA remedies, see Richards, Monetary Awards for Age
Discrimination in Employment, 30 ARK. L. REV. 305 (1976); Comment, Damages in Age Discrimi-
nation Cases - The Need for a Closer Look, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 573 (1983); Comment, Age
Discrimination: Monetary Damages Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 58
NEB. L. REV. 214 (1979); Note, Damages Remedies Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 47 (1976). For a broader coverage of issues arising out of all
facets of the ADEA, see Age Discrimination: A Symposium 32 HASTINGS L.J. 111 I (1981); Sym-
posium: Age Discrimination, 57 CHI [-] KENT L. REv. 805 (1981).
12. The issue of reinstatement will also be addressed insofar as it is related to the




The basic remedial provision of the ADEA is found in 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b), and states:
The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance
with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sec-
tions 211 (b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of
this title, and subsection (c) of this section. Any act prohibited
under section 623 of this title shall be deemed to be a prohib-
ited act under section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a
person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed
to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensa-
tion for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title: Provided,
That liquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of will-
ful violations of this chapter. In any action brought to enforce
this chapter, the court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal
or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter, including, without limitation, judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or en-
forcing the liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.
Before instituting any action under this section, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission shall attempt to eliminate
the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect
voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter
through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and
persuasion. 13
The first interpretive difficulty encountered in construing this provi-
sion is the omission of any specific definition of the term "amounts ow-
ing as a result of violation."1 4 Thus, the statute vests the trial court with
extraordinary latitude to fashion remedies which will effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act.15
The courts are in basic agreement that the "make-whole standard of
13. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (emphasis in the original). By way of contrast the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides in relevant part:
Any employer who violates the provisions of Section 206 or 207 of this Title shall
be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and
in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages . . . . The court in such
action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs,
allow a reasonable attorneys' fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
14. The language "[almounts owing . . . as a result of a violation . . . shall be
deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purpose of
sections 216 and 217 of this title," means only that "amounts owing" as a result of an
ADEA violation are to be treated as if they were "unpaid minimum wages or unpaid over-
time compensation" for the purposes of applying sections 216 and 217 of the FLSA, which
are incorporated into the ADEA.
15. The Congressional Statement of Purpose is found in 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982):
It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older per-
sons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimina-
tion in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment. Further details con-
cerning the congressional purpose in enacting the ADEA may be determined
1985]
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relief", as set forth in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,16 should be the
touchstone in fashioning legal and equitable relief for victims of age dis-
crimination. In addition, the courts generally recite the perceived poli-
cies of encouraging voluntary compliance and of avoiding litigation by
fostering conciliation between employer and employee. 17 At least one
court has explicitly acknowledged that monetary awards in ADEA cases
serve the dual function of compensating the employee for injuries
caused by the discriminatory conduct, and deterring future violations.18
The basic remedies most frequently discussed by the courts in
ADEA cases are back pay, front pay, damages for emotional distress,
punitive and/or liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees. Each of these
will be addressed in turn.
II. BACK PAY
The basic remedy for an employee who is discharged in violation of
the ADEA is back pay. While all courts presume that an award of back
pay is appropriate, others have gone farther and held that it is
mandatory. 19
The first step in calculating a back pay award is to determine the
value of the compensation to which the plaintiff-employee would have
been entitled absent the discharge. Because the purpose of a back pay
award is to put the employee in the economic position she would have
occupied but for the discrimination, back pay awards generally include
the value of job related benefits that would have been received during
the back pay period. The value of benefits such as pension benefits, va-
cation pay, health and life insurance benefits, and profit sharing are usu-
ally added to the award. 20 Prospective raises and commissions have also
been included in computing back pay.
2 '
The usual time period for computing back pay runs from the date of
from the legislative history, see H. REP. No. 90-805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted
in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2213.
16. 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).
17. Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 686-7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1039 (1982); Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 590 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (4th Cir. 1979);
Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1066 (1978).
18. Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1237 (3rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978).
19. McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217 (3rd Cir. 1984) (relying upon
dictim in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)).
20. See, e.g., Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1980) (pension benefits); Com-
bes v. Griffin Television, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (insurance benefits);
Whatley v. Skaggs, 508 F. Supp. 302 (D. Colo. 1981) (profit sharing), afd in part on other
grounds, 707 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 349 (1983); Kelly v. American
Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1981) (pension rights and fringe benefits).
21. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 160-61 (future wage in-
creases); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1981) (salary
increases); Loubrido v. Hull Dobbs Co., 526 F. Supp. 1055 (D. P. R. 1981) (commissions).
See also Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982) (reducing trial court's award,
holding that a projection of raises must be based on expert testimony, patterns of past
increases, or similar evidence).
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discharge to the date of trial. 22 However, in certain circumstances it has
been held that back pay should be computed from the date of discharge
to:
(1) the date upon which the employee reached an age beyond
the protection of the ADEA;23 (2) the date upon which the
employee would have been discharged for nondiscriminatory
reasons; 24 (3) the date upon which the employee, in a subse-
quent job, obtained the same income level as that of the job
held prior to the discriminatory discharge;2 5(4) the date of re-
instatement by the defendant-employer; 2 6 or, (5) the date of
the unreasonable refusal of a good faith offer of
reinstatement.
2 7
Once the amount of lost salary and job related benefits has been
determined, certain amounts are then deducted from the back pay
award. These "set-offs" usually fall into one of three categories: interim
earnings; amounts received directly from the defendant-employer at or




In contrast to Title VII, the ADEA contains no specific provisions
regarding set-offs.2 9 Nonetheless, those courts which have specifically
addressed this issue under the ADEA have held that an award of back
pay should be reduced by the wages actually earned by the plaintiff-em-
ployee following the unlawful discharge.3 0 While some courts appar-
ently view the deduction of interim earnings as automatic, other courts
have qualified the operation of the rule, allowing set-off only of those
interim earnings which actually mitigated the plaintiff-employee's loss.
For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that interim earnings from a part
time job that had been performed concurrently with the job from which
the plaintiff-employee had been unlawfully terminated should not be
set-off.3i The court reasoned that such earnings would not actually mit-
22. See, e.g., Brennan v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974); Combes v.
Griffin Television, Inc. 421 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
23. Brennan v. Western Operations, Inc., Consent Decree No. C-74-1039 (D. Cal.,
March 15, 1974).
24. Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co.,
695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982).
25. Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982).
26. Bishop v. Jelleff Associates, 398 F. Supp. 579 (D. D. C. 1974).
27. Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, 670 F.2d 806, 808 (8th Cir. 1982); Coates v.
National Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W. D. Va. 1977).
28. See Note, Set-Offs Against Back Pay Awards Under the Federal Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1113 (1981) (author proposes categorization of potential
set-offs in accordance with "make whole" theory of damages) (hereinafter cited as Set-offs).
29. Title VII expressly requires that interim earnings or amounts earnable with rea-
sonable diligence be set-off against back pay otherwise owing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1982).
30. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
913 (1978); Laugesen v. Anaconda Company, 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
31. Laugesen v. Anaconda Company, 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
1985]
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igate the plaintiff-employee's loss because those wages would have been
received even if the plaintiff-employee had not been terminated in viola-
tion of the Act.
3 2
In view of the inclusion of the value of fringe benefits in the compu-
tation of back pay, logic and equity would demand the set-off not only of
wages earned by the plaintiff-employee during the back pay period, but
also of the value of fringe benefits received during that period. 3 3 This
issue is seldom addressed in reported decisions.
Clearly, calculation and set-off of a plaintiff-employee's actual in-
terim earnings, including finge benefits received, are a prerequisite to an
accurate determination of the appropriate back pay award in an ADEA
action. Moreover, counsel should be cognizant of the fact that the court
may demand a showing as to whether the interim earnings actually miti-
gated the plaintiff-employee's loss. The time and effort expended in dis-
covery of interim earnings is well spent, for such information is also
helpful in determining whether the plaintiff-employee has exercised rea-
sonable diligence in mitigating losses.
34
B. Amounts Received from the Defendant-Employer
In deciding whether to set-off amounts received directly from the
defendant-employer at the time of or after termination, courts generally
look to the nature of the payment. Such amounts usually will be set-off
if the payment was one occasioned only by the wrongful termination. If,
on the other hand, the payment represents an amount actually earned by
the plaintiff-employee, it will not be set-off.
3 5
For instance, in Laugesen v. Anaconda Company 36 the court held that if
severance pay received by the plaintiff-employee was a payment that
32. Id. See also Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1977) (holding that
wages actually earned from other employment that could not have been simultaneously
performed with the job sought by the applicant-plaintiff should be set-off). In Kolb v.
Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982), the court held that the period for measuring
back pay should end on the date when the plaintiff-employee's earnings at his new job
exceeded those which he would have earned at his previous job, because "to continue the
period to the date ofjudgment would arbitrarily reduce the award." Id. at 874. Thus, not
all interim earnings were set-off.
In a recent case, decided under Title VII, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a rather novel
approach to the set-off of interim earnings. In Darnell v. City of Jasper, 730 F.2d 653
(11 th Cir. 1984), the court held that interim earnings are to be set-off against that amount
of back pay on a periodic as opposed to aggregate basis. In Darnelt, this allowed plaintiff to
recover despite the fact that in seven of the nine years in question he earned more at his
subsequent job, and actually earned more in total than he would have earned as a police
officer. General adoption of this test in ADEA cases could serve to substantially increase
some ADEA back pay awards.
33. See Loubrido v. Hull-Dobbs Co. of Puerto Rico, 526 F. Supp. 1055, 1058 (D. P.R.
1981); see also Set-offs, supra note 28 at 1121-2. In Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (1st
Cir. 1982), the court indicated that "post termination economic benefits" should be sub-
tracted from back pay awards, although apparently the bonuses received from the subse-
quent employer were not set-off from the back pay award.
34. The subject of mitigation is discussed infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983); EEOC
v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 626 (10th Cir. 1980).
36. 510 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1975).
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would not have been received by the employee but for the termination,
then it should be set-off.3 7 The court stated that even though severance
pay may be measured by length of past service, it was nonetheless a pay-
ment occasioned by an involuntary termination.3 8 The court distin-
guished severance pay from vacation pay, stating that the latter was an
amount actually earned by the employee and, therefore, vacation pay
should not be set-off.
39
However, in Naton v. Bank of California,40 the Ninth Circuit held that
amounts paid by the defendant-employer at the time of termination for
accumulated sick leave and vacation pay benefits were properly de-
ducted from a back pay award.4 1 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the
plaintiff-employee would not have been entitled to receive the monetary
value of those benefits had he teminated his employment through nor-
mal retirement.4 2 Instead, he would have been required to use those
accrued benefits by ceasing work prior to his retirement date.43 There-
fore, the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court had properly deducted
those benefits from the back pay award.
It is more difficult to resolve the issue of set-off regarding this type
of payment in cases where reinstatement is offered by the employer or is
ordered by the court. In Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc. ,44 the court recog-
nized that its decision to allow or disallow set-off of a stock bonus re-
ceived at termination could result in a windfall to the plaintiff-employee
or alternatively promote under-recovery. 4 5 The court remanded with
instructions to structure a decree avoiding either possibility.
46
As the facts of the Cline case demonstrate, a simple inquiry into
whether the payment was "occasioned by" termination will not always
be sufficient. The courts must be willing to tailor their orders regarding
set-offs in such cases to avoid the award of either a windfall or an inade-
quate amount.
C. Collateral Benefits
One of the most troublesome remedy issues under the ADEA is the
propriety of deducting from a back pay award any post-termination pay-
ments received by the plaintiff-employee from sources other than the
defendant-employer. Some courts apply the common law collateral
37. Id. at 317.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga.
1971)).
40. 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. Id. at 700.
42. Id.
43. Id. However, the court indicated that this result would have been different if the
employee had a "cash-out" option available.
44. 689 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. at 490.
46. Id. The crux of the issue was the plaintiffs ability to accept reinstatement and then
to voluntarily separate himself from the firm at a later date. If this was done absent an
offset of the stock bonus, plaintiff would reap a windfall. Thus the trial court was in-
structed to fashion a decree that would preclude manipulation by either party.
1985]
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source rule in deciding whether to set-off such benefits from a back pay
award. 47 Under the collateral source rule, amounts received by an in-
jured party from a source independent of the wrongdoer are not
credited against the damages owed by the wrongdoer. The rationale of
this rule is that the wrongdoer should not reap the benefit of payments
made by a third party.
The application of this rule to preclude set-off in ADEA cases, with-
out regard to the realities of the employment situation, can overcom-
pensate the plaintiff-employee and penalize the defendant-employer in a
manner never intended by Congress. On the other hand, if such bene-
fits are set-off, then the employer's liability is significantly reduced; re-
gardless of the nature or severity of the ADEA violation. Arguably, this
may reduce the incentives for voluntary compliance with the ADEA.
There is no clear concensus on the issue of set-off of collateral ben-
efits. The Third Circuit has held that unemployment compensation
benefits may not be deducted from back-pay awards. 48 Similarly, a
number of courts have affirmed where the trial court, in its discretion,
has refused to set-off unemployment compensation benefits from an
ADEA award. 49 The Seventh Circuit has, in dictum, approved a trial
court's decision to set-off both unemployment compensation and retire-
ment pension benefits from an ADEA award.
50
In Naton v. Bank of California5 l the Ninth Circuit held that "even if
the district court was authorized to treat unemployment compensation
as a collateral benefit, it retained the discretion under the ADEA to de-
duct the compensation from the back pay award.''52 However in a later
case decided under Title VII, Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp. , the same court
held that "unemployment benefits received by a successful plaintiff in an
employment discrimination action are not off-sets against a back pay
47. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980); Pedreyra v. Cornell
Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1979). The collateral source
rule has not, however, been applied to preclude the set-off of interim earnings, which are
truly "collateral" benefits.
48. McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214, 217 (3rd Cir. 1984) (no deduction
regardless of whether the benefits are funded by the employer). Other courts have ad-
hered to the same rule in the context of Title VII cases. See, e.g., Brown v. A.J. Gerrard
Mfg. Co., 715 F.2d 1549 (11 th Cir. 1983); Kauffman v. Sidereal Corp., 695 F.2d 343 (9th
Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981), rev'don other grounds,
458 U.S. 219 (1982), original position adhered to on remand, 688 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1982).
49. Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't., 697 F.2d 743, 756 (7th Cir. 1983); EEOC
v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624-6 (10th Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rub-
ber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977). These courts fail to indicate whether it is also
within the discretion of the trial court to allow set-off of such benefits.
50. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 161-2 (7th Cir. 1981). See also
EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local No. 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976) (de-
cided under Title VII) cert. denied, sub nom Rio v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters, 430 U.S.
911 (1977); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd in part and vacated
in part on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (decided under Title VII), superceded by statute as
stated in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1984) (Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act case).
51. 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. Id. at 700.
53. 659 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982).
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award. ' 5 4 The court left open the issue of whether the collateral source
rule would apply if the unemployment compensation was funded "di-
rectly" by the plaintiffs employer, rather than through a state fund sup-
ported by a tax on employers. 55
In EEOC v. Sandia Corp.,56 the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that
some courts had upheld the set-off of such amounts. The court termed
that position "somewhat questionable," and noted that such set-offs
would result in unjust enrichment for employers who have violated the
Act. 57 In those states where, upon receipt of a back pay award, employ-
ees are required by statute to repay to the state all benefits (such as
unemployment compensation) received during the back pay period,
there is no danger of double recovery, and the courts are likely to refuse
to set-off such benefits.
5 8
In many circuits, however, the issue remains unsettled. The sugges-
tion of one author that all employment related benefits that represent a
true gain to the plaintiff-employee should be set-off is one worth of seri-
ous consideration. 59  The focus of the courts should be upon the
"make-whole" purpose of the ADEA, and decisions regarding set-off of
collateral benefits should be made in such a way as to effectuate that
goal.
III. FRONT PAY
Under the ADEA, the trial court may in its discretion order the rein-
statement of a plaintiff-employee who has been discharged in violation
of the Act. There are, nonetheless, numerous situations in which the
courts have found that reinstatement is not possible or appropriate. For
example, the position may have been filled by another innocent em-
ployee, or there may be extreme hostility between the plaintiff-employee
and the defendant-employer. In such circumstances, some courts have
granted an award of monetary relief in lieu of reinstatement. Such fu-
ture damages are commonly referred to as "front pay." The concept of
"front pay" is fairly simple; its application to the facts of a particular
case however can be extremely difficult, creating numerous problems
for practitioners and the courts.
As the First Circuit noted in Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,60 front pay consti-
tutes payment for services not rendered and, more importantly, "any
assessment of what an individual might have earned had he been rein-
stated usually is highly speculative, given the possibilities of promotions
or legitimate demotions or terminations."' 6' The speculative nature of
such awards reaches awesome proportions when the employee is at the
54. Id. at 347.
55. Id. at 347 n.2.
56. 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980).
57. Id. at 625.
58. See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 257, 259 n.3 (D. Colo. 1980).
59. Set-offs, supra note 28 at 1121-28.
60. 600 F.2d 1003 (lst Cir. 1979).
61. Id. at 1023. (Footnote omitted).
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low end of the broad age group protected by the ADEA. 62
Several courts, including the First and Third Circuits, have shown a
distinct reluctance to grant front pay damages. 63 These courts have rea-
soned that such awards are highy speculative and that the possibility of
an award of front pay might make it less likely that plaintiff-employees
would settle short of litigation.
64
However, awards of front pay have received approval in the Second,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, and in numer-
ous district courts. 6 5 Those circuit courts which have allowed an award
of front pay have cautioned that there must be specific findings made by
the trial court as to why reinstatement is not appropriate. 66 Such awards
should only be made where calculation of the award does not require
undue speculation, either as to the possibility of future employment and
mitigation of damages, or as to the amount of money that the employee
would have received had she not been discriminatorily discharged.
6 7
These courts have reasoned that if front pay was not available in
lieu of reinstatement, the defendant-employer could significantly reduce
its liability by making the possibility of reinstatement unattractive for the
employee. 68 Concerns regarding the speculative nature of front pay
have been dismissed as insufficient to preclude such an award, due to
the experience of courts in calculating damages for future wages in em-
ployment contract and personal injury cases. 69 The requirement that
the plaintiff-employee mitigate damages, and the fact that front pay may
only be awarded in those limited situations where truly necessary to
compensate the plaintiff-employee have also been cited as justifications
for front pay awards.
70
In view of the fact that front pay is an award made in lieu of rein-
statement, which is an equitable remedy, the award should be made by
62. The protected age group under the ADEA consists of individuals between the
ages of 40 and 70. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1982).
63. Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869, 874 n.4 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing to Wehr);
Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 283 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that future damages
could not be awarded where the plaintiffhad impliedly disclaimed any desire for reinstate-
ment); Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 700-1 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (cit-
ing lack of support in a legislative history); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F.
Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (holding front pay not an appropriate remedy).
64. Ginsberg v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 500 F. Supp. 696, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dis-
cusses problem of settlement, but admits rationale weak); Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231, 235 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (noting speculative nature of damage).
65. Davis v. Combustion Eng'g Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922-3 (6th Cir. 1984); Whittlesey
v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 727-9 (2d Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say.
and Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1230-3 (10th Cir. 1984); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co.,
695 F.2d 1093, 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312,
1319 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). See also O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic
Hosp. Inc., 574 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Ventura v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 571 F.
Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Hoffman v. Nissan Motor Corp., 511 F. Supp. 352 (D.N.H. 1981).
66. See EEOC v. Prudential, at 1233.
67. Whittlesey, at 729.
68. EEOC v. Prudential, at 1232.
69. Whittlesey, at 728-9.
70. Id. at 729; Davis, at 923.
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the trial court, rather than by thejury.7 1 This arguably reduces the pos-
sibility of a large, completely speculative award of a punitive nature.
IV. MITIGATION
As noted previously, Title VII expressly requires the set-off of
amounts "earnable with reasonable diligence."'7 2 The ADEA has no
such express language, yet the courts have uniformly held that an em-
ployee who is discharged in violation of the ADEA is required to use
reasonable efforts to mitigate damages. 73 It is not required that such
efforts be successful, so long as the employee makes an honest, good
faith attempt to obtain other employment.
74
The burden is on the employer to demonstrate that suitable posi-
tions existed which the plaintiff-employee could have discovered and for
which plaintiff was qualified, and that the plaintiff-employee failed to ex-
ercise reasonable diligence in seeking such positions. 75 If the defendant
carries this burden the amount of the back pay award is reduced by
those amounts that the plaintiff-employee would have earned, had she
used reasonable diligence.
In determining mitigation issues under the ADEA, the focus is upon
the reasonableness of the plaintiff-employee's actions. It has been held
that a plaintiff-employee discharged her obligations to use reasonable
efforts to mitigate in situations where she had regular contact with an
unemployment board and held a part time job during the back pay pe-
riod,7 6 or where the employee accepted a lower paying position in a
field outside of her usual type of employment. 7 7 Nonetheless, it is not
unreasonable for a plaintiff-employee to reject the offer of a job in a
distant city.
78
In the situation where, prior to the time of trial, the defendant-em-
ployer has offered to reinstate the plaintiff-employee to her former posi-
tion, such an offer of reinstatement has been held to cut off the time for
calculating back pay. 79 However, if the plaintiff-employee's refusal to ac-
cept the offer of reinstatement is reasonable, then such refusal does not
constitute a failure to mitigate, and therefore does not toll the back pay
period.8 0 For example, where the offer of reinstatement is conditioned
in a way that could affect the plaintiffs claim, or the offer is to reemploy
71. Gibson, at 1100-1; Ventura, at 51.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
73. See, e.g., Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488 (4th Cir. 1982); Fiedler
v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. Sandia Corp.,
639 F.2d 600, 627 (10th Cir. 1980).
74. Sandia, at 627.
75. Id. See atso Coleman v. City of Omaha, 714 F.2d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 1983); Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 278 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980).
76. Orsel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1983).
77. Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488-89 (4th Cir. 1982).
78. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 119 (4th Cir. 1983). The court
noted that relocation is particularly unwelcome for victims of age discrimination.
79. See cases discussed at note 27 supra.
80. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1983).
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in a different job with less status, fewer prospects for future advance-
ment, and less compensation, the offer does not automatically cut off the
back pay period. 8 1 On the other hand, it has been held that the mere
fact that there is some friction between the parties because of the pend-
ing litigation is, by itself, an insufficient basis for refusal of an offer of
reinstatement. 8 2 It is generally for the jury to determine whether the
reasons for refusal of the offer of reinstatement were reasonable.
8 3
The issue of mitigation is crucial to a determination not only of the
proper amount of back pay, but also as to the appropriate amount of
front pay. Courts which have allowed front pay have indicated that the
employee's duty to mitigate continues beyond the time of the trial.
84
These courts have not, however, dealt with the problematic issues of
proof created by allowance of front pay. For example, the burden will
remain on the defendant-employer to prove the amount that the plain-
tiff-employee can be expected to earn in the future. It is not clear
whether the courts will go so far as to require the defendant-employer to
demonstrate, by the use of expert testimony, the projected availability of
jobs in those fields in which the plaintiff-employee is qualified in order
to limit the front pay award. Obvious difficulties present themselves in
the situation where the plaintiff-employee has been terminated from a
job which is obsolete. Must the defendant-employer prove the availabil-
ity of training in fields other than those in which it had employed the
plaintiff?
In sum, despite statutory silence plaintiff-employees discharged in
violation of the ADEA are required to mitigate their damages. The bur-
den of proving a failure to mitigate rests on the employer. Issues of
proof of future mitigation in connection with a claim for front pay prom-
ise to create numerous, complex problems for practitioners and courts
in the future.
V. PAIN AND SUFFERING
All appellate courts which have ruled upon the availability of dam-
ages for emotional distress caused by an ADEA violation have held that
such damages are not recoverable, 85 although at least two district courts
81. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983); Orzel v.
City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't., 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983).
82. Cf. Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 282 (8th Cir. 1983).
83. Id., Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line Inc., 670 F.2d 806, 808-09 (8th Cir. 1982).
84. See cases discussed at note 65 supra.
85. Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984); Hill v. Spiegel,
Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1983); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir.
1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1982); Naton v. Bank
of California, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981); Slatin v. Stanford Research Ins., 590 F.2d 1292
(4th Cir. 1979); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1978); Dean v.
American Sec. Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. denied 434 U.S. 1066 (1978);
Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978). See also Waters & Pursell, Emotional Distress: The Battle Over a New Tort
Under Age Discrimination Continues, 30 LAB. L.J. 667 (1979); Comment, Awarding Compensatory
Damages for Pain and Suffering in Age Discrimination Cases: A Proper Reading of the Statute?, 29
S.C.L. REV. 705 (1978).
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have awarded such damages. 86
In denying damages for pain and suffering, the courts generally
have relied upon the ADEA's silence on the availability of such damages
and upon the adverse effect that the availability of awards might have on
the administrative conciliation process. 8 7 Some courts have based their
refusal upon perceptions of congressional intent. In Slatin v. Stanford
Research Institute,88 the Fourth Circuit focused on the incorporation of
certain FLSA provisions into the ADEA. The court reasoned that Con-
gress had implied knowledge of judicial interpretations of the FLSA
which uniformity failed to permit recovery of compensatory damages for
pain and suffering. Hence, Congress must have intended a similar result
under the ADEA. 89
Countervailing arguments exist. As the courts have acknowledged
in other contexts, the remedies specifically listed in the ADEA were not
intended to be as an exhaustive list.90 Instead, the courts are given the
power to grant whatever legal or equitable relief as appropriate to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Act. It is interesting to note that the Tenth
Circuit in Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp.,9 1 in denying damages for pain
and suffering, stated, "[wle can but conclude that the trial court erred in
allowing jury consideration of any item of damage except those specifically pro-
vided within the enforcement scheme of the ADEA. ' '92 However, in
holding that an award of front pay in lieu of reinstatement was an appro-
priate remedy under the ADEA, the Tenth Circuit in EEOC v. Prudential
Federal Say. and Loan Assn.,93 stated, "we conclude that the legal and eq-
uitable remedies available under the ADEA are not limited either to those
specifically listed or to those available under the FLSA, so long as the relief
if 'appropriate to effectuate the purposes of [the Act]'.
' '94
It might be argued that the refusal to award damages for pain and
suffering is inconsistent with the oft-stated goal of the ADEA; that is, to
counteract the adverse effects of age discrimination and to make the
plaintiff-employee whole for whatever losses were caused by the viola-
tion of the Act. However, it is fairly clear that damages for pain and
suffering and for emotional distress are not available under the ADEA.
VI. LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides, in part:
86. See, e.g., Wise v. Olan Mills, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 542 (D. Colo. 1980); Buchholz v.
Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
87. See, e.g., Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984); Rogers v.
Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978).
88. 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir. 1979).
89. Id. at 1293.
90. See, e.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir.
1984).
91. 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984).
92. Id. at 657 (emphasis added).
93. 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984).
94. Id. at 1232 (emphasis added).
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Any employer who violates the provisions of this title shall be
liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid overtime compen-
sation. . . and in an additional amount as liquidated damages.
The ADEA also provides that "amounts owing to a person as a result of
a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages
or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of §§ 216 and 217 of
this title ... " 95 and that liquidated damages shall be payable only in
cases of willful violations of the ADEA. Therefore, an employer who
willfully violates the ADEA is liable not only for "amounts owing", but
for an additional equal amount.
The liquidated damages provision of the ADEA has raised numer-
ous issues which have been resolved in varying ways by the courts.
Some courts have held that, in the event of a willful violation, the em-
ployee is automatically entitled to the maximum amount of liquidated
damages, 9 6 rejecting the argument that the good faith defense in Sec-
tion 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act 9 7 applies in cases under the ADEA.
The courts have reasoned that Congress specifically selected those por-
tions of the Portal-to-Portal Act which it wished to incorporate into the
ADEA and that those provisions not expressly incorporated do not ap-
ply.9 8 The First Circuit, in Loeb v. Textron,9 9 reasoned that on its face, 29
U.S.C. § 216(b) required that liquidated damages be awarded once a vi-
olation is shown. "Section 11 mitigates this result in FLSA cases ... [i]n
ADEA cases the 'willfulness' test serves the same function and renders
§ 11 superfluous."' 0 0 Other courts, however, have indicated that there
is some discretion in the trial court to determine whether the full liqui-
dated damage award shall be made.' 0 ' At least one court has held that
the maximum liquidated damage award is twice the amount of the back
pay award, and that front pay should not be included in the
calculation. 102
The courts have also taken different positions as to the nature of an
award of liquidated damages. Some courts have held that the purpose
of such a liquidated damage award is punitive; and have thus denied
recovery of punitive damages.' 0 3 Other courts, however, have charac-
95. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
96. EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225, 1234 (10th Cir.
1984); Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1983); Kelly v. American Standard
Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 981-(9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1020 (4st
Cir. 1979).
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, 251-62 (1982).
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1982), expressly incorporating §§ 6 and 10 of the Portal-
to-Portal Pay Act.
99. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
100. Id. at 1020. See also Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 279 n.5 (3rd Cir.
1980) (citing Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979)).
101. Elliott v. Group Medical and Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 558 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2658 (1984); Hayes v. Republic Steel Corp., 531 F.2d 1307, 1311-12
(5th Cir. 1976); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D. Ga.
1982).
102. O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., 574 F. Supp. 214, 223 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
103. Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); Dean v.
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terized liquidated damages as compensatory rather than a punitive, 10 4
relying upon the House Conference Report regarding the 1978 amend-
ments to the ADEA:
The ADEA as amended by the Act does not provide remedies
of a punitive nature. The conferees therefore agree to permit a
jury trial on the factual issues underlying a claim for liquidated
damages because the Supreme Court has made clear that an
award of liquidated damages under the FLSA is not a penalty
but rather is available in order to provide full compensatory
relief for losses that are "too obscure and difficult to prove for
estimate other than by liquidated damages."'
10 5
Under this view, liquidated damages compensate the plaintiff-employee
for losses that are difficult of certain calculation, such as pre-judgment
interest. Therefore, to prevent double recovery by the plaintiff-em-
ployee, most courts have held that a plaintiff-employee cannot recover
both liquidated damages and pre-judgment interest, at least absent ex-
ceptional circumstances. 10 6 Recently, however, in Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston,10 7 the Supreme Court held that "Congress intended for
liquidated damages to be punitive in nature."' 0 8
Even those courts, which prior to Transworld Airlines, characterized
the liquidated damage award as non-punitive in nature usually refused
to allow recovery of punitive damages. These courts reasoned that:
such damages are not expressly provided in the ADEA; Congress pre-
sumably had knowledge that the FLSA had been interpreted as disallow-
ing punitive damages when it incorporated the remedial provisions of
the FLSA into the ADEA; and, an award of punitive damages would un-
dermine the administrative conciliation process. 10 9
American Sec. Ins., Co., 559 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066
(1978).
104. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Blim
v. Western Elec. Co. Inc., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, sub nom
A.T.&T. Technologies, Inc. v. Blim, 53 U.S.L.W. 3241 (1984).
105. H. CONF. REP. No. 95-950, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 13-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 535. (Citation omitted).
106. See, e.g., Blim v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 731 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir. 1984);
Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 1982); Spagnuolo v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1114 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981). Contra Cris-
well v. Western Airlines, 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983) appeal pending, 104 S. Ct. 2340
(1984); O'Donnell v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp.. Inc.. 574 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
107. 53 U.S.L.W. 4024 (1985).
108. Id. at 4027. The Court, in Trans Vorld Airlines, also adopted the "reckless disre-
gard" standard for the application of liquidated damages. If the employer knew his con-
duct was prohibited or showed reckless disregard as to whether his conduct was
prohibited, he committed a "willful" violation thus entitling the plaintiff to liquidated
damages. Id. at 4028. The Court also concluded that § 11 of the Portal-to-Portal Act was
not incorporated into the ADEA, but stated that, "[nievertheless, we think that the same
concerns are reflected in the proviso to § 7(b) of the ADEA." Id. at 4028 n.22.
109. Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 694, 686-7 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1039 (1982). Cf. Johnson v. Altech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1984);
Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1022 (1978).
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VII. ATrORNEY'S FEES
The Fair Labor Standards Act,' ' which is incorporated by the
ADEA,"' provides that in an action under the FLSA the court "shall, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a
reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by defendant, and costs of the
action." 1 12
Based on the statutory language "shall", most courts have viewed
the award of attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff-employee as
mandatory."13 The amount of any attorney's fee award is within the dis-
cretion of the trial court. An award of attorney's fees for the costs of
prosecuting an appeal under the ADEA may also be awarded.' l4 It
should be noted that the language of the FLSA regarding attorney's fees
is more restrictive than that of Title VII insofar as, under the FLSA,
attorney's fees are to be awarded in addition to any judgment awarded to
the plaintiff.' 1 5 Thus, there is no provision for the award of attorney's
fees in connection with administrative proceedings, and it is questiona-
ble whether attorney's fees would be awarded in a case where the plain-
tiff succeeded in obtaining a favorable settlement. 1 16 There is also no
provision in the ADEA for an award of attorney's fees to a successful
defendant. 117
VIII. CONCLUSION
The types and amounts of damages available in an ADEA action
remains a confusing area for the practitioner. The Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals remain divided on many of the central issues and the Supreme
Court has made few moves to resolve the resulting tangle of conflicting
authority. Over the near term, the law of the relevant circuit often will
remain the primary authority in the resolution of many issues; particu-
larly questions regarding front pay, mitigation and aspects of liquidated
damages remaining unresolved in the wake of Trans World Airlines.
110. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
I1. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
112. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982).
113. Weisel v. Singapore joint Venture Inc., 602 F.2d 1185, 1191 n.18 (5th Cir. 1979);
Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1244 (3rd Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
114. Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 682 F.2d 44, 48 (2nd Cir. 1982); Hecrick v. Hercules,
Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1981); Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d
974, 986 (9th Cir. 1981); Cleverly v. Western Elec. Co., 594 F.2d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 1979)
(per curiam), afg 450 F. Supp. 507 (W.D. Miss. 1978).
115. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982).
116. See, e.g., Vocca v. Playboy Hotel, 686 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
117. See EEOC v. Western Elec., Co. 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1259, 1260 (1983).
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